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Joined 5 years ago
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Cake day: October 2nd, 2020

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  • without further context, i’m not sure you could read much into a single act of downloading

    it could be as simple as it contained some keywords for a lit review someone was doing

    from there they might eliminate it from their review, choose to cite it favourably, or choose to criticise it.

    if the journal has a good reputation, being a comparatively frequently read (downloaded) paper from a periodical could be considered a positive reception.


  • i’m not an expert, but here’s my take.

    personally i question when such movements take power that we should interpret it as consent by the public majority.

    part of the reason the public apparently bestow power to the machinery of government is because the machinery is supposed to protect them from this very thing happening.

    the fact that it is happening, means such a rise in fact did not occur within the correct functioning of that machine.

    therefore we should probably question whether we should interpret it as consent by the majority.


    and if its not consent by the majority, then in some ways the picture is both bleaker and brighter.

    brighter, because you’re not surrounded by quite so many evil fucks as they wanted you to believe

    bleaker, well, probably don’t need to explain that bit


  • ok fair enough, sorry i may have misinterpreted what you meant.

    it sounds like your argument is that if the attacker doesn’t know the service is running then the assertion that this reduces the risk profile is classified as an obscurity control - this argument is correct under these conditions.

    however, certain knocking configurations are not obscurity, because their purpose & value does not depend on the hope that the attacker is unaware of the service’s existence but rather to reduce the attacker’s window of access to the service with a type of out of band whitelisting. by limiting the attacker’s access to the service you are reducing the attack surface.

    you can imagine it like a stack call trace, the deeper into the trace you go, every single instruction represents the attack surface getting larger and larger. the earlier in the trace you limit access to the attacker, you are by definition reducing the attack surface.

    in case i’ve misinterpreted what you meant. susceptibility to a replay attack does not mean something isn’t a security measure. it means it’s a security measure with a vulnerability. ofc replay attacks in knocking is a well known problem addressed long ago.

    perhaps the other source of miscommunication is for us to remember that security is about layers, because no single layer is ever going to be perfect.










  • can you pls explain what you mean in more depth?

    your original post is sufficiently vague that tbh i don’t blame people for assuming you were just bootlicking? [which probably says more about the state of the world than you as an individual, but honestly it’s not clear what you’re trying to say?]

    we all know a random citizen/local business presenting an identical calibre of evidence of repeated crimes would be extremely unlikely to routinely receive this degree of resource allocation.

    so if it’s an idealised aspirational universal “order” you’re talking about then obviously noone’s buying it - and i don’t think you are either. so what do you mean?